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This  article  considers  the political,  economic,  and environmental  factors  associated with the
allocation of federal  LISA (Low  Input/Sustainable Agriculture)  funds  among states.  A  tobit
model is estimated with LISA  allocations  as the dependent  variable.  Results  indicate  that
pressure  groups are  important.  LISA funding  depends positively on  membership  in
environmental  organizations,  the number of farms,  and the size  of the rural-nonfarm
population,  while it depends  negatively  on  the size  of the  urban population.  States with host
LISA institutions  receive  significantly  more funding,  as do states  with  Senators  in leadership
positions on key  congressional  agricultural  committees.
Improving  the  environment  and  conservation  of  tion (SARE)  Program.  SARE has broader,  vaguer
natural resources  have historically  been objectives  goals  than  LISA  (U.S.  General  Accounting  Of-
of  agricultural  policies.  Along  with  increasing  fice),  but reducing  the use of inputs  with adverse
farm income and improving the welfare of the rural  environmental  and health effects is  at least implic-
poor,  soil  conservation  has  been  a  goal  of  farm  itly part of these broader  goals.
policies since the New Deal.  With the  widespread  LISA/SARE  is  administered  differently  from
adoption  of  chemical  fertilizers,  ,pesticides,  and  most  federal  agricultural  research  and  extension
herbicides since the  1930s,  broader  environmental  programs.  Most funds  have  traditionally  been  al-
and  health  concerns  have  emerged  (Doering).  located  among states on the  basis of statutory for-
These environmental and health issues are increas-  mulas.  At  the  state  level,  decisions  on  program
ingly reflected  in  agricultural  policies.  One  such  content  have  traditionally  been  made  at  the  col-
policy,  initiated  in  1987,  is  a  federal  program  lege,  academic  department,  and  individual  scien-
called LISA  (Low  Input/Sustainable  Agriculture).  tist  levels.  In  contrast,  LISA/SARE  is  adminis-
LISA  funded  research  and  extension  programs  to  tered through  host institutions  in four  regions.  In
assist  farmers  in  using  scientific  information  and  the first two years  of the LISA program (1988-89),
on-farm  resources  to  reduce  the  use  of  fertilizer  these  institutions  were  the  University  of Vermont
and other chemical inputs (Madden).  In addition to  in the Northeast region, the University of Nebraska
environmental  concerns,  the financial situation  of  in the North Central,  the  University  of Georgia  in
farmers  in the  1980s also contributed  to the LISA  the South,  and  the University  of California  in the
program,  since  many  saw  it as  a way  to  increase  West. Funds are allocated to each region and then,
net  farm  income  by  reducing  input expenditures  within each region, project proposals are reviewed
(Daberkow  and  Reichelderfer).  by committees  appointed by the host institution. In
The  Food,  Agriculture,  Conservation,  and  addition,  the  organization  of research  and  exten-
Trade  Act of  1990 changed  the LISA program  to  sion projects  are more  constrained in LISA/SARE
the Sustainable  Agriculture  Research  and  Educa-  than  in  traditional  programs.  Program  guidelines
for each project suggest inclusion  of both research
and  extension  components,  multidisciplinary  and
The authors  are,  respectively,  Associate  Professor,  Department of  Ag-  multi-state participation,  and inclusion  of farmers,
ricultural  Economics  and Rural  Sociology,  Pennsylvania  State  Univer-  private research institutions,  and  ther agricultural
sity, Armsby Building,  University Park,  PA 16802-5600,  and Professor,
Department  of  Agricultural  and  Resource  Economics,  University  of  government  agencies.
Maryland,  Symons  Hall, College  Park,  MD 20742-5535.  The  type  of  administrative  structure  used  by
This  article  was written while Musser  was  at Penn  State University.  LISA/SARE  has  been  endorsed  by  some  as  a
William  Lacy,  Stephen  Ford,  Joseph  Terza,  Otto Doering,  and  three 
anonymous  reviewers  provided  helpful  comments  on  earlier  drafts.  method of making agricultural research  and exten-
Brooke  Smokelin  and  Lydia Cunningham  provided  assistance  in  data  sion more  responsive  to broader  interests,  includ-
analysis.  Various environmental organizations  generously provided  data 
on  their  membership,  and  Greg Hanson  kindly  provided  data  on farm  ing the development and dissemination  of sustain-
loan losses.  able  technologies  (Busch and  Lacy;  National  Re-16  April 1995  Agricultural  and Resource Economics Review
search  Council;  U.S.  Office  of  Technology  fers by exerting political pressure. The list of ways
Assessment).  However,  others  argue  that  such  a  to exert pressure is long,  but would include lobby-
program  structure will make  agricultural  research  ing expenditures (in money and in time),  campaign
and extension  less productive  (Just and Huffman;  contributions,  bribes  and  kickbacks,  demonstra-
Huffman and Evenson; Chubin and Hackett).  Crit-  tions,  strikes,  and riots.  Demand curve shifters in-
ics  argue  that  it  encourages  short-term,  applied  elude the size of the group and the anticipated  gain
projects  with  sure payoffs  at the expense of long-  per group member from the program(s) under con-
term,  more  basic,  or  riskier  projects  that  might  sideration  (Becker;  Gardner;  Peltzman).  Group
ultimately generate higher returns. They also claim  size in general has an ambiguous effect on political
that the year-to-year funding variability inherent in  influence.  On the  one hand,  a  larger  group  size
the competitive grant process reduces productivity,  means  that a group can  spend more in money  and
and that  time  spent  writing grant proposals  is di-  in time on exerting  political  pressure, holding  ex-
verted from research  activity. In addition, they as-  penditures per group member constant. This group
sert that hidden and major conflicts of interest po-  size  effect  is especially  disadvantageous  for very
liticize committee review  processes,  causing com-  small groups,  because there are often fixed costs to
mittees  to reward  friends  and  associates.  participating in the political process that make po-
LISA/SARE  has  probably  not  existed  long  litical  activity  by  these  groups  uneconomic.  As
enough to make a decision on administrative struc-  group  size  increases,  these  fixed  costs  impose  a
ture with  respect  to  this  program.  However,  the  smaller  burden  on  each  group  member.  On  the
performance  of LISA/SARE  in  reference  to  the  other hand,  a larger group  size worsens  free  rider
allocation of funds can be evaluated, especially the  problems,  because  everyone  is  more  inclined  to
influence of political considerations on funding de-  leave  the  expenditure  of  resources  for  lobbying,
cisions.  The objective of this article is to consider  making  contributions,  demonstrating,  etc.  to  oth-
the political, economic,  and environmental  factors  ers.  The result is that,  for large groups,  expendi-
affecting  the  distribution  of LISA  money  among  tures  per group member  tend to decline  as  group
states during fiscal years (FYs)  1988-89.  A polit-  size increases.
ical "market"  for LISA  funds  is constructed  and  Politicians  and bureaucrats  supply income trans-
then  used  to construct  an  empirical  model of the  fers  by  raising  funds  (through  a  wide  variety  of
allocation of funds.  We focus on  1988-89 because  programs)  and  then  channeling  them through  the
data  on  LISA/SARE  allocations  for  later  years  political  and  bureaucratic  process  toward  groups
were  unavailable  when  this  study  was  initiated.  that  are demanding  transfers.  The costs of raising
Furthermore,  LISA  had  much  clearer  objectives  funds depend on the economic environment and on
than SARE,  which facilitates  model formulation.  the instruments used to obtain funds (e.g.,  an out-
put subsidy financed by taxpayers vs.  a price floor
The Market for LISA  Funds  financed  by  consumers  and taxpayers).  The costs
of channeling  funds  through the political  and bu-
In modeling  the  allocation  of LISA  research  and  reaucratic  process depend on the program(s) under
extension  funds  among  states,  it  is helpful  to fol-  consideration  and  the  overall  political  environ-
low earlier studies of agricultural research  and ex-  ment.  Some factors within the context of the LISA
tension funding in using the theoretical concept of  program  that affect  the  cost of transferring  funds,
a market for government programs (e.g.,  Guttman;  and  thus  shift the  supply  curve  for income  trans-
Huffman  and  Miranowski;  Rose-Ackerman  and  fers,  are discussed below.  The costs of transferring
Evenson;  White and Araji).  Like  any market,  this  funds  also  depend  on  competing  demands  for
one  has  both  demanders  and  suppliers.  The  de-  funds.  Clearly,  resources devoted  to one  program
manders  in  a political  market  are  the  groups that  cannot be spent elsewhere.  While  the general pub-
benefit  from the program(s)  under  consideration.  lic  may  be  unaware  of the  fact  that  a particular
The  suppliers  are  the politicians  and  bureaucrats  program  even  exists,  politicians  and  bureaucrats
who  institute  and administer  the program(s).  The  recognize that the program is consuming resources
good  being  exchanged  is  income,  with  the  pro-  that could  have been used to  garner political sup-
gram(s)  as the vehicle for this exchange.  Payment  port from other interest groups.
for  the  good  can  take  a  wide  variety  of  forms,  For the LISA program,  important groups on the
depending on the program(s)  and the overall polit-  demand  side include public-interest  groups  with a
ical environment.  Some examples  within the con-  concern about the environmental and health effects
text of the LISA program  are discussed below,  of fertilizers  and pesticides,  because LISA was  in
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(Madden).  Farm  and rural  groups  also  belong on  the  fact that  every  state has  limits  on its  political
the demand side,  because farm financial  stress and  influence in Washington,  DC. Scarce political cap-
associated rural  economic hardships  have  created  ital used to garner LISA funds is capital that cannot
interest  in  cost-reducing  technologies  (Daberkow  be used to obtain other funds.
and Reichelderfer).  These  groups  may  also be in-  The  "price"  of LISA  funds  has  political  and
terested  in developing  technologies  for their state  monetary  components.  For members of Congress,
that  are  consistent  with  evolving  regulations  on  it  is  measured  in  votes,  campaign  contributions,
pollution and food safety.  In addition,  states  com-  in-kind campaign assistance, and other political fa-
pete with each other in agricultural  markets. Farm  vors.  For USDA  officials  and  LISA  administra-
and rural groups in one state might lobby for LISA  tors,  it is measured  in  salaries,  benefits,  research
funds simply to  prevent the  money from  going  to  support,  and other types of assistance provided by
another state.  their respective  institutions.  Some  components  of
One would expect the demand for LISA funding  this  price  are  easily  observable  (e.g.,  campaign
by  public-interest  groups  and  others  concerned  contributions),  but  others  are  not  because of pri-
about the environment  and  public health  to be an  vacy considerations  (e.g.,  salaries and benefits).  In
increasing function of perceived dangers  from ag-  any case,  estimating  the marginal  impact of LISA
ricultural chemicals.  Risks to the  environment and  funds  on  votes  for  members  of Congress,  cam-
human  health  from  agricultural  chemicals  vary  paign  contributions,  or  other  observable  compo-
from one region to another because  both the extent  nents of this price  would be  difficult and fraught
of chemical  usage  and  the  risks  from  any  given  with error.  This  article  therefore  uses  a reduced-
level of  usage vary  by  location.  One  would  also  form formulation expressing LISA expenditures in
expect demand for LISA funding by farm and rural  a given state as a function of the above demand and
groups to be an increasing function of farm finan-  supply  shifters.  This is  a common  practice  in the
cial  stress.  literature on program funding across states,  includ-
The  supply  side  for  LISA  includes  those  who  ing agricultural research  and  extension.
make  allocation  decisions:  members  of Congress,
U.S.  Department of Agriculture  officials,  and  the
decentralized administrators of the LISA program.  Data and  Econometric  Methods
Clearly,  it is  easier  to  secure  LISA  money  for  a
state if its Congressional  delegation is in a position  This section presents  the data,  variables,  and esti-
to influence allocation decisions.  It is also easier if  mation methods.  The unit of analysis  in this study
LISA administrators  or USDA officials are partial  is the state.  Summary statistics for all variables are
to that state.  LISA administrators  and proposal re-  shown in Table  1, while data sources and complete
viewers  may  also  favor  grant  applications  from  variable definitions are provided  in the Appendix.
their own  institution  or state  for  self-interest mo-  Of the  50 states,  44 received  LISA funds  (the six
tives.  While  such  motives  may  not  be  explicit,  without  any  funds  were  Alabama,  Florida,  Ken-
standard  political-economic  reasoning  suggests  tucky,  Nevada,  New  Hampshire,  and  Rhode  Is-
that they are likely implicit (Chubin  and Hackett).  land).
In this context,  the fact that LISA applications  are  It may  be  noted  that  the  four  host  institutions
reviewed  at a regional level rather  than  a national  seemed  to  receive  a  disproportionate  amount  of
level  is important.  A region may be less likely  to  LISA money during the first two years of the pro-
have a sufficient number of disinterested scientists  gram. Of the $5.52 million in LISA funding during
to review  proposals  than  the  country  as  a whole.  FYs  1988-89,  the  four host  universities received
Personal relationships may also be stronger among  $1.07  million  (19%)  (USDA,  LISA  88-89).  On
scientists  and  administrators  within  a region than  average,  states  with  host  institutions  received
within  the country  as  a whole.  about 200% more  in LISA funds  than states with-
Competing  demands  on  LISA  funds  also  shift  out  host institutions.  By comparison,  states  with
the supply  curve  for reasons  discussed  above.  As  host institutions received only 7.8% of total federal
the non-rural  population increases,  the  number of  agricultural  research  dollars  during  FYs  1988-89
people  on  which  and  variety  of  ways  in  which  (USDA,  Inventory of Agricultural Research). To
LISA funds  could have been spent also increases.  help obtain  a feel  for the data,  it  is also useful to
Since  LISA  is  a  federally  funded  program,  one  examine the  association between LISA  allocations
might  argue that channeling LISA  funds to a state  and  total federal  agricultural  research  allocations.
does not preclude channeling  other federal funds to  The correlation  coefficient  between  the two  vari-
that state's urban interests.  However,  this  ignores  ables  is not statistically different  from zero  (0.18,18  April 1995  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table  1.  Summary Statistics of State  largest total federal  agricultural  research  expendi-
Variables in Tobit Analysis  tures.  Four states appear  on both lists: Pennsylva-
nia,  North  Carolina,  Texas,  and Virginia.  How-
Standard  ever, the two states  with most LISA  funding,  Cal-
Variable  Mean  Deviation  r  Variable  Mean  Deviation  ifornia  and  New  York,  are  not  among  the  ten
Agricultural Research  (1987  $/year):  highest  for  all  funding.  Two  of the states  in the
LISA,  1988-89  (thousands)  52  59  LISA top ten,  California and Vermont,  are among
All Federal,  1988-89  the four regional LISA host institutions.  The other
(millions)  3.4  1.8  two  host  institutions,  Georgia  and Nebraska,  do Group Membership:
IAA/AFT,  1990  279  400  not appear among the top ten LISA funded states.
All Farms,  1987  (thousands)  42  37  The dependent  variable in the regressions is av-
Rural-Nonfarm  Population,  1980  erage  annual  LISA research and  extension project
(millions)  1.1  0.83  allocations  during  FYs  1988-89.  (Administrative
Farm  Bureau,  1988  (thousands)  74  96
aIntensity  of Group  Interest  (1987  expenditures by the host institutions or institutions
$/year):  submitting proposals,  matching funds, etc.  are not
Fertilizer Expenditures,  1987  included.)  The independent variables  fall into four
(thousands)  134  132  categories:  membership  numbers  for  interest
Ag  Chemical Expenditur94  103  groups  benefitting  from LISA  (these shift the de-
1987 (thousands)  94  103
Farm  Loan Losses,  1984-88  mand  curve for LISA funding); variables measur-
(millions)  80  104  ing  the  intensity  of the  interest  groups'  stake  in
Supply-Side Variables:  LISA  (also  demand  shifters);  political  variables
LISA  Host Institution  Dummy  0.08  0.27  that  shift  the  supply  curve  for  LISA  funding  to
Senate  Key Committee  Dummy  0.08  0.27
House Key Committee  Dummy  0.08  0.27  each state; and other variables  that serve  as proxies
Urban  Population,  1980  for possibly relevant factors omitted from the anal-
(millions)  3.3  4.1  ysis.
Regional Dummies:  As  indicated  earlier,  LISA  money  was  distrib-
North Central  0.24  0.43  uted  to  states in  a two-stage  process.  In  the  first South  0.26  0.44
West  0.26  0.44  stage,  funds  were  allocated  to  each  of  the  four
regions.  In the second  stage,  each region divided
its funds among its member states.  The economet-
t-ratio =  1.2). However, the real test of the impact  ric model  used  here  attempts  to  explain  the  two
on LISA allocations of either total federal agricul-  stages as  a whole  rather than  separately.  It would
tural research allocations  or of having a host insti-  be interesting to  model each  stage  separately,  but
tution is in the regressions  below,  since they hold  that  would  require  additional  years  of  data  on
other relevant variables  constant.  LISA/SARE  allocations  that  were  unavailable  to
The ten states with the largest LISA funding are  us.  Regional  dummies  are  included in  the regres-
listed in Table 2,  along with the ten states with the  sions in order to capture differences  among regions
Table 2.  Top Ten States,  LISA  and All  Federal Agricultural Research (Annual  Averages,  FYs
1988-89,  in 1987$)
LISA  Funding  All Federal Ag  Research
($1000)  ($  Million)
Rank  State  Amount  State  Amount
1  California  304  Texas  7.5
2  New York  182  North Carolina  7.2
3  Pennsylvania  171  Alabama  6.3
4  Washington  170  Kentucky  6.0
5  Massachusetts  131  Tennessee  5.8
6  Vermont  111  Georgia  5.7
7  North  Carolina  95  Missouri  5.7
8  Minnesota  84  Pennsylvania  5.3
9  Texas  84  Virginia  5.2
10  Virginia  83  Mississippi  5.2
- All-State  Average  52  All-State Average  3.4Abler and Musser  LISA  Research and Extension Funding  19
in the first  stage  of the  allocation process  not ac-  tion,  total expenditures  by farmers on  commercial
counted  for by the other explanatory  variables.  fertilizer  and  expenditures  on  other  agricultural
On the demand side,  the sum of membership  in  chemicals  (which  are  largely  pesticides)  are  in-
the Institute  for Alternative Agriculture  (IAA) and  cluded  as  demand  shifters.  To  test  the  extent  to
the  American  Farmland  Trust  (AFT)  is  used  to  which farm financial stress affected the intensity of
represent  environmental  pressure  groups  with  a  support  for  LISA  among  farm  and  rural  groups,
specific  interest  in  agriculture.  IAA  includes  re-  annual losses incurred  by banks  on farm loans  are
searchers  and  others  directly  interested  in  LISA,  included in the analysis  as another demand shifter.
and  has  grown  rapidly  since  its  creation  in  1983  A  set of dummy variables  is used to model  the
(Swenson).  The focus of AFT is on broader  agri-  supply  side  for  LISA  funding.  The  first dummy
cultural  conservation  issues,  but  it  is  also  inter-  variable  equals  one  if the  state  has  a  host  LISA
ested in LISA.  AFT is also included because of its  institution  and  zero  otherwise.  Another  dummy
substantial  political influence  (Browne).  The sum  variable  equals one if the state had a ranking  Sen-
of IAA and  AFT  membership  is used  rather  than  ator on the Agriculture  Committee  or the Agricul-
two separate  membership variables  because of the  ture Subcommittee  of the Appropriations  Commit-
high  correlation  coefficient  (0.78,  t-ratio  =  8.6)  tee  in  the  100th  (1987-88)  or  101st  (1989-90)
between  membership  in these  two  organizations.  Congresses.  (A  ranking  Senator  is  a  committee
While  this  sum  may  introduce  double-counting,  chairperson  or a ranking  minority  member of the
that  is  not  necessarily  undesirable.  A person  be-  committee).  A similar dummy variable is included
longing  to both groups  may be more  active  than a  for the House of Representatives.  Also included on
person belonging  to just one;  more  concretely,  a  the supply side is the size of the urban population.
person  belonging to both  is contributing member-  As  noted  above,  the  number of people  on  which
ship dues twice.  and the variety of other ways in which LISA funds
The other political pressure  groups included on  could have  been spent increases  as the urban pop-
the demand side are farmers  as a whole,  the rural-  ulation increases,  shifting the supply curve inward.
nonfarm  population,  and  the Farm  Bureau.  The  Other potential  supply  and  demand  shifters  are
Farm Bureau  is the largest  farm organization  and  unmeasurable  or not easily  measured.  To capture
has  been  skeptical  of LISA (Korves),  so  that  its  any  variables  common  to LISA  and  other federal
support for LISA may be less than farmers or rural  agricultural  research  programs,  average  annual
people  generally.  federal  agricultural  research  expenditures  (on  all
It should  be  noted  that  including  these  group  programs)  during FYs  1988-89  are included.
size variables  in the model does  not presume  that  The most  important  variables  missing  from the
each  person in  every  interest  group  has  heard  of  analysis  are  measures  of  the  number,  size,  and
LISA. It only presumes that (1)  the leaders of these  quality  of LISA grant proposals  submitted by  in-
groups and their legislators in Congress  are aware  vestigators  in  each state.  Some  states might  have
of the program,  and  (2)  these leaders  and  legisla-  received  little  money  simply because  few  efforts
tors  are looking  out for  what they perceive  to be  were made to secure funds.  Unfortunately,  no data
the best interests of their groups.  As indicated  ear-  were available  to us on  submissions.  In any  case,
lier, the size  of a group  affects  its  political influ-  submissions would probably  also need to be made
ence.  The leaders of a group with more influence  endogenous,  because investigators may respond to
can  bargain  more  effectively  for  programs  that  the same political-economic  considerations  that af-
they perceive  will benefit their members,  such  as  fect  final  funding  decisions,  either  directly  or
LISA for the  groups that  we study.  through signals from administrative  superiors.  The
As  discussed  above,  theory  suggests  the  rela-  IAA/AFT variable  may  proxy for  potential  appli-
tionship between group size and political influence  cants  in  a state  because  it  is  plausible  that most
may be nonlinear,  since there  are forces  that tend  applicants  were  members  of these organizations.
to  make  both  small  and  large  groups  politically  A  tobit model  is used  in estimation  because of
weaker  than  medium-sized  groups.  We  tried  in-  zero values for the dependent variable in six states.
cluding the squares of group sizes in addition to the  The tobit model  captures both  the decision to  al-
group  sizes  themselves  to capture  any  nonlineari-  locate  or not to allocate  funds to  a particular  state
ties,  but multicollinearity  prevented  us  from  ob-  and the decision about how much to allocate,  given
taining  any satisfactory results. Thus we report the  that funds are going to be allocated  (see Maddala).
results  without these quadratic terms.  In  estimating  the  tobit  model,  the  dependent
To  capture  the  intensity  of concern  among  en-  variable  and  all  the continuous  (non-dummy)  in-
vironmental organizations  about agricultural pollu-  dependent  variables  are  divided  by  their  sample20  April 1995  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
means.  This  transformation  yields unit-free  vari-  states had host institutions.  Evaluation of this po-
ables.  The coefficients  on the continuous  indepen-  tential  problem  would require  additional  years  of
dent variables  are (approximately)  elasticities  with  data.
this  transformation,  and  the  coefficients  on  the
dummy  variables,  when  multiplied by  100,  show
the  percentage  changes  in  LISA  funding  due  to  Results  and Discussion
these  dummies.1 Logarithmic  transformations
were  also  tried,  with  ln(l  +  LISA)  used  as  the  Maximum-likelihood  estimates for two tobit mod-
dependent  variable  in  order  to  take  care  of  the  els  are  shown  in Table  3.  The total  federal  agri-
cases  where  LISA  =  0.  However,  the  results in-  cultural  research funds  variable is included  in the
dicated that a log model is not at all appropriate for  first  model,  while  it is  excluded from the second
the data.  Goodness-of-fit measures were  very low  model.  The estimated  coefficient  on this variable
and  almost  all the estimated coefficients  were sta-  in  the  first  model  is  not  statistically  significant.
tistically  insignificant.  With a few exceptions,  estimated  coefficients and
Standard errors of the estimated coefficients  are  asymptotic  t-ratios  for the other variables  are sim-
calculated  by  both  the usual  method  and  with  a  ilar  between  the  two models.  This robustness  in-
method in White that is robust to model specifica-  dicates  that  fundamentally  different  political-
tion error.  Let A be the matrix  of second  deriva-  economic  forces  are  driving  LISA  spending  and
tives of the log-likelihood function and let B be the  federal  agricultural research  spending  generally.
cross-product  of the first  derivatives.  White's  ro-  The standard  error  for the  host institution  vari-
bust covariance  matrix for the coefficient estimates  able  is  significantly  smaller with White's  method
is  A-  BA-1.  Under  the usual  assumption  of in-  than  with the usual method,  while the other stan-
formation matrix equivalence (A  =  -B),  White's  dard errors are close to  each other.  These similar-
matrix collapses  to the  usual  - A-  . For compar-  ities  in  standard  errors  suggest  that  specification
ison,  t-ratios  calculated  by  the  usual  method  are  error has  only a limited impact  on the results,  ex-
also reported  below.  cept  perhaps for the  host institution.  Even in that
The  results  here  could  be contaminated  by  si-  case,  the  statements  below  regarding  asymptotic
multaneous  equation  bias,  since  IAA/AFT  mem-  statistical  significance  or insignificance  are  unaf-
bership  is treated  as  exogenous.  Both  groups  are  fected by the  choice of the covariance  matrix.
very  interested  in  LISA,  and  LISA  expenditures  Among  pressure  groups,  the  estimated  coeffi-
could increase their membership.  Smith and Blun-  cient for IAA/AFT membership is large in magni-
dell's test for exogeneity  was used to evaluate the  tude and highly statistically significant. The results
potential  for simultaneity.  For this  test,  the  vari-  indicate that a  10%  increase in IAA/AFT member-
able  of concern  (IAA/AFT  membership)  is  re-  ship  is  associated  with  about  a  10%  increase  in
gressed  on  a set  of exogenous  variables,  and  the  LISA  spending,  a  substantial  effect.  In contrast,
residual from  that  equation  is included  as  an  ex-  the estimated  coefficient  for Farm  Bureau  is  sta-
planatory  variable  in the tobit equation.  If the  re-  tistically  insignificant.  The  numbers  of  farms  is
sidual  is statistically  insignificant,  the variable of  statistically significant and positive. Holding other
concern can be treated as exogenous.  The variables  variables  constant,  a  10%  increase  in numbers  of
included in the IAA/AFT  equation were  member-  farms  is  associated  with  about  a 4%  increase  in
ship  in  general  environmental  organizations  (see  LISA allocations.  Farmers generally appear to sup-
the  Appendix),  farms,  rural-nonfarm  population,  port  LISA,  but  this  support  is  not  statistically
urban population,  per capita income,  and dummies  greater  or smaller for  farmers  who are  also Farm
based on  the Census Bureau regions.  Bureau members.
The  host institution  variable  might also be  en-  Support for LISA is at least as strong among the
dogenous.  However,  testing  or correcting  for  si-  rural-nonfarm  population  as  among  farmers.  A
multaneity  here  is  impossible  because  only  four  10%  increase  in  the  rural-nonfarm  population  is
associated  with  about  a 5-8%  increase  in  LISA
allocations.  However,  the differences  between  the
1 The model is of the form Yy  =  a + E3pixi i +  jyjzj,,  where y,  estimated rural-nonfarm  and  farm coefficients  are
is  the  dependent  variable  for  the tth  observation,  the x,  are  the  non-  not  statistically  significant  (t-ratio  =  1.2 for  the
dummy  independent  variables,  and  the zj,  are  the  dummy independent  first  model,  0.6 for the  second model).
variables.  The  variables y and T.,  are  the  corresponding  sample  means.
Neglecting  the changes in the sample  means y and x, as y, and xi, change  Neither the fertilizer variable nor the agricultural
(which will be negligible if there are a large number of observations),  we  chemicals  variable  is statistically  significant.  Per-
have  d(yIy)  - dyy and d(xi-,)  - dxx ,.  Evaluating these  derivatives
at the sample  means y,  =  y and x,, =  -,  we  obtain  dyly  =  dy/y  =  haps these variables  are poor proxies for the envi-
dlny and dx,/xi = dxri = dlnx.  Thus Pi  d  alnylrlnx, and y j I  lnyazj.  ronmental  and  health risks  posed by  current pro-Abler and Musser  LISA Research and Extension Funding  21
duction practices.  Fertilizer and chemical expendi-  on the residual  from the IAA/AFT equation is 0.17
tures measured  on a per acre basis were  also tried  (0.4).  Furthermore,  other coefficient  estimates  do
in regressions not reported here,  but they were not  not vary much from the models in Table 3.  Among
statistically  significant  either.  Other  measures  of  the  statistically  significant  variables,  the  average
environmental  and health risks (e.g.,  groundwater  percentage  change  in  the  coefficient  estimate
contamination  figures  in  Nielson  and  Lee)  were  caused by  including this  residual  is less than  5%.
also tried,  but were  not statistically  significant.  In  the  equation  without  total  federal  agricultural
The estimated coefficient  for farm loan losses  is  research funding,  the estimated coefficient (t-ratio)
positive,  small in magnitude,  and statistically  sig-  on the residual from the IAA/AFT equation is 0.24
nificant at the  10% level but not the 5%  level. The  (0.6). Among the statistically significant variables,
results  indicate  that  a  10%  increase  in farm  loan  the  average  percentage  change  in  the  coefficient
losses  is  associated  with  about  a 2%  increase  in  estimates in this case is only about  7%.
LISA  disbursements.  These  results  support  the
view discussed  above that the farm financial crisis
of the  1980s played only  a supporting  role in the  Conclusions
LISA program.
The  results  for  the  supply-side  variables  are  The  objective  of this  article  was  to  consider  the
largely  consistent  with prior  expectations.  States  political economy of allocation of research and ex-
with a regional coordinator receive more LISA al-  tension  spending  on  the  LISA  program  among
locations,  and this effect is statistically significant.  states  during  its  first  two  years.  Results  indicate
Other things equal,  the  difference  is  about  60%.  that  the  disbursement of LISA  money  is strongly
While  large,  this effect is  less than the  200% dif-  related to political  considerations.  On the demand
ference  that  one  sees  in  the  raw  data  on  LISA  side of the market for LISA funds,  membership in
allocations  (i.e.,  the difference  not  holding  other  political  pressure  groups  definitely  matters.  The
things constant).  allocation  of  LISA  funds  to  a  state  is  highly  re-
Similarly,  the  estimated  coefficient  for  Senate  sponsive to membership  in that  state in the Amer-
key committee  is positive  and statistically  signifi-  ican  Farmland Trust and the  Institute  for Altema-
cant.  Having  a key Senate  committee  member  is  tive Agriculture,  two public-interest  groups with a
associated with about a 70% increase in LISA dis-  strong interest  in LISA.  LISA  allocations  also re-
bursements.  The  four  states  with  these  Senators  spond positively and to  a significant degree  to the
were  Vermont,  Indiana,  North  Dakota,  and  Mis-  number of farms  and the rural-nonfarm  population
sissippi. However,  only Vermont is  among the top  in the  state.
10  in  LISA  allocations,  so  this variable  does  not  Variables  included  to  measure  the  intensity  of
explain the rankings  in Table  2 by  itself.  In  con-  demand  among  states  were  not  generally  impor-
trast,  the House key committee variable is statisti-  tant. In particular,  the results provide  only limited
cally  insignificant.  Texas,  Illinois,  Mississippi,  support for the  view that LISA  was  a response to
and Massachusetts  are  the states  with these mem-  recent  financial  problems  faced by  farmers.  Re-
bers.  Ironically,  two  of these  states  were  among  sults  indicate  that  states  with  higher  farm  loan
the  highest ten LISA  allocations  in Table  2.  losses  received  more  LISA  money  than  other
As expected,  the estimated coefficient  for urban  states, but not a lot more. More surprisingly, LISA
population  is negative  and statistically significant.  allocations  were not related to the use of fertilizer
A  10% increase  in the urban population  is associ-  or pesticides,  which  was  an  important motive for
ated with  a 8-10%  decrease in LISA  allocations.  establishing  the program.
The dummy variables  for the North Central and  On  the  supply  side  of  the  market  for  LISA
South regions  are  statistically  insignificant,  while  funds,  states  with host institutions receive signifi-
the  estimated  coefficient  for the  West  dummy  is  cantly  more  money,  even  after  controlling  for
positive and significant at the 10% level but not the  other  factors.  Similarly,  states  with  Senators  in
5%  level.  This effect  is related  to regional  alloca-  leadership  positions  on  key  agricultural  commit-
tion decisions to the West vs.  the Northeast  in the  tees  receive  substantially  larger  LISA  allocations.
first-stage  of  the  two-stage  process  discussed  These  results  support  general  concerns  raised
above (allocate money to regions,  then divide each  about the politicization of competitive grant fund-
region's  money among its member states).  ing (Chubin and Hackett).  On the other hand, hav-
Results of the  Smith-Blundell test  indicate that  ing  a Representative  in  a similar  position  in  the
IAA/AFT  membership  can  be  treated  as  exoge-  House  does  not have  a statistically significant  ef-
nous. In the equation with total federal agricultural  fect on LISA  allocations.  Members  of the House
research funding,  the estimated coefficient (t-ratio)  apparently use  their political  influence elsewhere.22  April 1995  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 3.  Tobit Results of State Allocation  of LISA Funds, FYs  1988-89
Estimated  Coefficient
(Absolute  Value,  Asymptotic  t-Ratio,  White's  Method)
[Absolute Value,  Asymptotic t-Ratio,  Usual  Method]
Variable  With Federal  Ag Research  Without Federal  Ag Research




IAA/AFT  1.07*  0.98*
(5.8)  (5.7)
[5.2]  [5.0]
Farms  0.49*  0.36*
(2.5)  (2.0)
[2.0]  [1.5]
Rural-Nonfarm  0.86*  0.55*
(3.2)  (2.7)
[2.8]  [2.5]
Farm Bureau  -0.22  -0.23
(1.4)  (1.4)
[1.6]  [1.7]
Intensity  of Group Interest:
Fertilizer  -0.20  -0.21
(0.6)  (0.6)
[0.5]  [0.5]
Ag Chemicals  0.23  0.16
(0.7)  (0.5)
[0.7]  [0.5]




LISA Host Institution  0.59*  0.60*
(3.4)  (3.3)
[1.8]  [1.8]
Senate Key Committee  0.67*  0.74*
(2.5)  (2.7)
[1.9]  [2.1]
House  Key Committee  0.13  0.09
(0.5)  (0.3)
[0.3]  [0.2]




North  Central  -0.02  -0.12
(0.0)  (0.3)
[0.0]  [0.3]
South  0.62  0.22
(1.5)  (0.6)
[1.3]  [0.5]
West  0.55*  0.51*
(1.9)  (1.8)
[1.9]  [1.7]
Intercept  -0.14  -0.36
(0.4)  (1.4)
[0.5]  [1.3]
Actual  vs.  Predicted r
2 0.79  0.78
Degrees  of Freedom  34  35
NOTE:  An * denotes  significance at the  10%  level, based  on t-ratios calculated  using White's method.  The predicted value of the
dependent  variable,  LISA,  is Pt  = (t,'x,  + ar,, where P  is the vector  of coefficient  estimates, x,  is the  vector of exogenous
variables,  and  a is the  estimated  standard  error.  ,(I and (4, are the distribution  function and the  density function of the  standard
normal,  respectively,  evaluated  at  3'x/cr.Abler and Musser  LISA  Research and Extension Funding  23
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